Vol. XVII.
Nos. 7 & 8.

JULY & AUGUST 1921.

Whole
No. 193, 194.

13 JUL 1922

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The Jaina Gazette.

Strange, is it not? that of the myriads who
Before us pass'd the door of Darkness through,
Not one returns to tell us of the Road,
Which to discover we must travel too.

The Revelations of Devout and Learn'd
Who rose before us, and as Prophets burn'd,
Are all but Stories, which, awoke from sleep
They told their comrades, and to sleep return'd.

—*Omar Khayyam.*

Communion with the Self.

IT is always a pleasant, though a difficult task to associate with the soul for a few moments. By self, however, is not meant the self as manifest to the outward eye, for it is not pure self. Pure self cannot show itself externally. It must have, what we may call the non-self to act as base, before it can so show itself. Thus the self is that eternal light in us which silently whispers "I am" in our ears, that invisible thing which distinguishes life from death, that abstract Chaitanya which entitles man to be called a knower; in short, that immortal substance which we call soul.

But, as has already been said, it is very difficult to communicate directly with the soul. Before consenting to let you see him, he must be first assured that you are in earnest about seeing him. Even after he has agreed to an interview with you, he comes with innumerable tests to ascertain your resolution in the pursuit of him.

You concentrate your attention and in the first place set about knowing the whereabouts of the soul. At last you find that consciousness tells you the place of the soul. You direct your attention towards him, and he, loth to let you approach him so easily, begins to sound you, as it were. With this object at one time he says "Hark! who knocks at your ears." You direct your attention there but soon recall it. However you find that you have fallen back to the point from which you started. You retrace your footsteps and move a little further than before, when the soul suddenly exclaims "Oh! How pretty." You begin to look in the direction pointed out and on resuming your course see that the same lot has befallen you again. You proceed more determined this time, but the soul too is wise enough to lead you astray with a still stronger force. He cries "And have you forgotten all about your love." And you are lost once more. In this way you are deceived several times through your five senses and the mind, till at last you grow experienced and determined. By constant practice you become all-absorbed in deep self—meditation and cease to deviate from the path. It is, then, that the soul receives you with open arms, though even then He does not disclose himself to you. He keeps silent to make you wait till you reach the stage when the powers of your senses are all benumbed, so much so, that if a needle be pricked into your body, you do not feel it.

It is to be observed, by the way, that it requires a great deal of practice before men can so completely engage in self-concentration as not to be affected at all by outward influences or inward feelings. It does no good to a man to deceive himself by pretending that he has acquired self-concentration. He must try self-control and get accustomed to it. Our Jaina Sadhus suffered the twenty-two pains, or Prisahas as they are called, not so much to be purposely and intentionally subject to them as to focus their thought towards their Atma but so that they may not be disturbed by anything from without. Supposing a beginner is repeating his

formula on the rosary when a wasp comes flying and sits on his nose. Now some Jainas, (with some pretension to have read the Charnanuyoga section of our Shastras) would undoubtedly say that he should, on no account, lift up his finger to remove the unexpected visitor. My idea is that he should see, for a few seconds, if he is so much advanced in practice as to go on with his meditation calmly, otherwise he should get rid of his intervener rather than haste over the remaining beads mindlessly and trembling all through. To come to the main subject. Having tried your patience to the utmost and fully satisfied him as to your anxiety to know him, the soul welcomes you saying, "you have now fully deserved to learn about me." He then appears in his right colour, glowing with a pure white transcendent lustre, and begins to divulge his true nature to the seeker after knowledge thus :—

"I am what you call Jiva Dravya. From eternity I am in the company of matter (Pudgal) which is another Dravya quite distinct, and having opposite qualities. I am mixed up with it like ore metal. I have always been faithfully attached to this my companion, considering him to be my friend but on later thoughts, I find him my enemy in disguise. I have ever loved him most affectionately, I have derived pleasure in his pleasure and grieved in his grief. He has been attacked by diseases and I have cried; misfortunes have befallen him and I have wept; honours have been bestowed upon him and I have rejoiced; in fact, I have wholly given myself up to him, become one with him, lost my individuality, as it were trusting that he would never mislead me; but, just see, how he has requitted my love and regard for him. He has utterly blinded me. He has made me forget my true self, my true qualities, my true attributes, my true function, and to cut the matter short, my true everything. He has not only blinded me but crippled me in every respect and put a limit to every power in me. In my pure-self, I am a perfect whole, apart from everything, dependent on nothing, eternal, immortal, invisible, invincible, above pleasure or pain, hope or despair, subject to no gravitation, no force, all powerful, all happy, seeing all, knowing all. I have attributes, besides, too numerous to be enumerated, but my deceitful companion has made me wear coloured spectacles and see things in quite a disguised and false light; so I have lost sight of all of them. I have not stopped here.

On the contrary I have gone so far, that even if any one reminds me of any of my attributes, I disown it. If some one says "you are a knower of all things," I reply "you are a liar." What I now take to be mine, are Anger, Pride, Delusion and Avarice. To pine for momentary worldly gains and to do all sorts of nonsense I regard as my true function, to indulge in the pleasure of the senses and of the mind as my prime duty, to love this person or that thing as my only care. All that belongs to matter, I call my own. In the material world, if any one is seen bewailing, for the fact, that the cost which he has put on to save himself from cold, must be suffering cold, is rebuked as a lunatic, but my wiseself has not escaped such foolishness too. I have several times got troubled, that the flesh and blood that envelope me, are exposed to climatic hardships.

"If, ever, I recover from the state of torpor and think of flying up to my natural abode, I find myself chained. Though, I am, at interval, left by gross matter and am able to rise high up towards my home, yet I am not allowed to continue my progress for more than one moment. I am again dragged down by the weight of my two fetters, the Taijas (Electric) and the Karman (made up of Karmas) bodies, which are still in my feet and am again encaged. My condition, atl that time, resembles that of a flame which stretches upwards but is fastened to the wick. Or more properly, I am like a piece of cork fastened to a rock at the bottom of an ocean but struggling to come up. As the cork, when loosend, instantly floats up to the surface, being helped to it by water, till stopped by the atmosphere above, so I, when liberated from everything which surrounds me, be that gross or fine, take my upward course, aided by the Dharma Dravya (motion) till stopped by the Adharma Dravya (stillness) I have to undergo a long process of purging, before I am so liberated. During this hard course of purification, I, for the first time, realise my true self. Not only this. I also begin to read an inner and real meaning in everything else and to reject the superficial and the unreal. I conquer my enemy, at last, with the Trident of Right Faith, Right knowledge, and Right conduct, and free myself from his imprisonment. I am. then, transferred from this foreign land to my native place, there to reign, for ever, in Perfect Bliss, Peace and Calmness."

Such is the account which your soul gives you of himself. You seem for the time being, carried away by his discourse. You leave him, cast an eye over your familiar physical world, but as you are yet fresh from the spiritual world, where you have just been, with impressions received there quite green in your memory, you look upon it in the spirit in which a spectator observes a cynometographic scene, believing all the phenomena to be transient and ephemeral. By and by your senses overcome you, and you are once more the gross man that you were.

STUDY.

Saptabhangi.*

OR THE

SEVEN MODES OF PREDICATIONS.

BY

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THE Dialectic of *Syadvâda* is no less puzzling to Indian students of philosophy both old and new, than the *Hegelian* dialectic is to the European philosophers. *Syadvâda* and its counterpart appear at first sight self-conflicting and unwarranted. But they have an important principle,—nay the fundamental principle of reality as their substratum and justification. Closer examination reveals in them a clear grasp of truth. Every other theory of knowledge is fading into insignificance before the principle of conditional predication.

Everything existing from the bespangled heavens above to the inmost core of human personality is in a process of change and modification. If we trust ourselves to the imagination of the astronomer which enables him to look back through eons of the past cosmic history or to have a glimpse of the far-off future we see the universe as a motion picture on the screen of existence. What is a twinkling star at present was once upon a time gigantic nebulous mass of several million miles diameter. Then by process of aggregation and condensing there is the formation of a denser nucleus which becomes larger and larger by the same process which in its turn leads to the evolution of an enormous quantity

* From his Introduction to his translation of "Panchastikaya."

of heat. This leads to the formation of the fiery orb which by the same laws of motion gives birth to a number of incandescent masses. These held to the parent by the laws of gravitation form the planetary system. Thus our Sun itself is but a star among the starry systems.

Side by side with this evolution of a sun with its planetary system we have the converse drama enacted. Either due to a mysterious explosion or due to a clash of star with star there bursts into existence a new mass of nebula. The telescope reveals to human view not only the nursery of distant solar systems, but also the decay and dissolution of the decrepit and defunct starry systems. The starry heavens are but the cosmic alphabet which spell the three sublime words birth, growth and decay.

Turn now to our own earth which is but a tiny speck in space when compared to the Sun and the Stars. Here also the same process. The formation of the crust of the earth is after terrible volcanic convultions which had taken place in the early history of the earth. The geological changes are followed by the appearance of life on the surface; then the wonderful evolution of the plant and animal kingdoms are all indelibly written on the different strata of the earth. This also repeats the same story. Then life itself is a mysterious though subtle process of combined building up and breaking up. Turn where you will you see the same thing. Reality is a complex process of change and everything in it is partaking of the same process.

Nothing is merely permanent; nothing is merely changing. The acorn grows to the oak; the seed is in the plant and the tree and yet it is not there as the seed. Everything lives by the process of death. The very loss leads to gain. This message of the organic reality is an important contribution to philosophy.

Hegel founded his metaphysics on Logic—nay—identified both. But his Logic is not the mere scholastic logic on which his predecessor *Kant* built his system. *Hegel's* logic came as a disturber of peace to the then philosophic thought; but it ultimately led to the emancipation of thought from scholastic thraldom. He proclaimed boldly to the world that affirmation and negation are ultimately reconciled by a higher unity. 'Is' and 'is not' are really identical and same, for they are but the aspects of the same reality. To one who is familiar with this dialectical process of thesis and antithesis reconciling in a higher synthesis, the follow-

ing presentation of *Saptabhangi* will lose its paradoxical nature and discover the underlying truth.

Long ago the Jainas recognised this complexity of existence. Any particular object which as the topic of assertion can very well take in two assertions—affirmative and negative. How can there be two apparently contradictory statements both true of a single fact? "The nature of the fact is such," is the answer. Every concrete assertion presupposes a question as to the exact nature of the object. This interrogation again rests on the desire to determine the thing from a particular point of view. Since the thing has several aspects and relations there may be several determinations. Hence is the possibility of apparently conflicting attributes inhering in the same and exhibited by the process of predication. Is that statue of marble or of plaster of Paris? If it is one, it is not the other. Is that the same gold bangle which you had last year? No, it is newly made though the same gold is used. Was Socretes a Greek or Roman? He was a Greek and not Roman. What is the *Kaiser* now? He is and yet is not the *Kaiser*. These are familiar questions and answers. All these exhibit the possibility of predicating affirmation and negation of the same thing. *Is* and *is not*, can significantly refer to the same subject. The only thing we have to remember is that the point of view is different in each case. There is nothing mysterious, nothing incredible. When the same subject can have two such predicates no one predicate can monopolise the subject to itself. There will always be some aspect of the subject left out by this predicate; and this left-out aspect can very well be expressed by the rival predicate. This implies that under no circumstances can we have a predication which is the only true predication about the subject. There can be no judgment absolutely true and excluding every other judgment about the same topic. Hence we have recourse to qualified assertions as the only available ones under the circumstances. These qualified or conditional assertions are primarily two,—affirmation and negation.

(1) Perhaps X is.

(2) Perhaps X is not.

These two aspects are inherent in the same thing; hence we can say.

(3) Perhaps X *is* and *is not*; here we are contemplating the whole thing in its two aspects which are kept apart and attended

to severally. But these two aspects are inherent in and expressive of one single identity. Hence they may be considered together jointly as expressing the single identity. In that case there is no chance of asserting two conjointly by a single predicate, for the simple reason that there can be no such predicate. Therefore we have to confess our inability to and proclaim the bankruptcy of vocabulary for having such an assertion. This fact becomes the fourth mode of predication.

(4) Perhaps X is indescribable.

Remembering this helpless nature of our tongue, we may still qualify this by each of the first three predicates. Thus we have the last three modes of predications.

Which are (5) Perhaps X is though indescribable.

(6) Perhaps X *is not* though indescribable.

(7) Perhaps X *is* and *is not* though indescribable.

In their traditional form these are :—

(1) *Syâdasti*

(2) *Syánnâsti*

(3) *Syâdastinâsticha*

(4) *Syâdavaktavyah*

(5) *Syâdasti avaktavayh*

(6) *Syâdnâsti avaktavyah.*

(7) *Syâdasti nâsti avktavyaha*

These seven modes of predication are usually illustrated with reference to some object such as a Jar or *Ghata*. Whether it is to have an affirmative predicate or negative one depends respectively on four aspects: its own form, matter, place and time leading to affirmation and alien form, matter, place and time bringing in negation to the jar. A jar is real, or is affirmed with reference to *Svarupa*, *Svadravya*, *Svakshetra*, *Svakâla* and is unreal or is denied from the point of view of *pararupa*, *paradravya*, *parakshetra* and *parakala*. When we have affirmation and negation for their reasons, the subsidiary modes are derived from these two.

1. Then what is *Svarupa* or intrinsic form of a Jar? And what is its *pararupa*? When we hear the word *jar* uttered, the term invariably implies a certain definite group of attributes through which a particular object is designated by the term. These essential attributes connoted by the term *jar* will be its *Svarupa*. The attributes of any other object implied by any

other term will be its *pararupa*—will be alien to the *Jar.* Existence rests on *Svarupa* and non-existence on *pararupa.* If existence is predicated of the *Jar* both from its own form as well as that of an alien thing like cloth (*pata*) then the *jar* will lose its distinctive character and become one with cloth. If on the other hand non-existence is predicated from its own form as from alien nature then there will be no jar at all. Neither of these results stand to reason.

Again confining ourselves to the class of vessels we still find that a *jar* is different from a kettle. Is that vessel a *jar* or kettle? The *jar-form* is its *svarupa* and the kettle form is its *pararupa.* From the former the *jar* is, from the latter, it is not.

Again we may be concerned with jars alone. One individual *jar* has its individuality as *Svarupa,* and every other *jar* will be *pararupa. Jar* A exists on account of *svarupa* and does not on account of *pararupa.* If non-existence is associated with *svarupa* then there will be no *jar* at all; if existence follows from *pararupa* then all *jars* will become one without distinction and there will be no separate individual ones.

Then *Ghata*-Jar is made by the potter. The mass of clay on the potter's wheel is not yet a *jar.* It is only the finished product that is a *jar.* This finished form is its *sva rupa*; any other stage in its formation is its *pararupa.* The former leads to affirmation the latter leads to negation.

2. What is its own matter? Clay is *Svadravya,* and gold is *paradravya.* The *Jar* is of clay and is *not of gold. Svadravyena asti, paradravyena nâsti.*

3. What is its own place or *Svaksketra*? The ground where the *Jar* is, is its *Svakshetra* and every other place is its *Parakshetra.* The *Taj* is in Agra (*Svakshetra*) and is not in Delhi (*Parakshetra*). If the *Jar* exists in *Parakshetra* also then there will be no place without a *Jar.* In the case of the *Taj* every place will have a *Taj Mahal.* If the thing is not even in its own place then there will be no Jar anywhere in the world. Either result will be unsatisfactory.

4. What is its own time or *Svakâla*? The *Jar's Svakâla* is the duration of the present in which it is intact. Its past when it was a mass of clay on the potter's wheel and its future when it

will be a heap of broken shells will be its *Parakâla*. Its existence in its own time and non-existence in other times will be quite evident. So also with every other object. *Socrates* existed at a particular age of Athenean History and is not existing now. If a thing exists in *Parakâla* also as in *Svakâla* then it will be eternal; if it does not exist in *Svakâla* as in *parakâla* then it will be nothing; for existence implies a relation to its time or duration.

Thus a thing is affirmed in its four-fold self-relation, form, matter, place and time; and is denied in its four-fold alien relation.

Now the *Svarupa*, etc., are determined with reference to the four-fold other-relation of *Pararupa*, etc. The self-relation apart from the other relation has no meaning. But how are we to determine the four kinds of relation :—*Pararupa*, *Paradravya*, etc. These must depend on their environmental relations and these latter again on others. Thus we pass on from our environment to others still wider without having any clear grasp of the self-relation. The distinction between a thing and its other rests on the sandy foundation of a vicious indefinite regress. Hence the affirmation and negation also fall to the ground.

This objection rests on misapprehension. The distinction between the fourfold self-relation and other-relation does not rest on an indefinite regress. The essential nature of a thing not only implies its *Svarupa* but differentiates itself from *Pararupa*. In experience we not only perceive a thing, but perceive it as distinct from other things. A *Jar* is seen not merely as a *Jar* but as a thing distinct from cloth by its side. Without this distinction there can be no perception of the *Jar* at all. The very process of self-assertion implies differentiation from non-self. Hence the charge of indefinite regress is quite unwarranted.

Now, according to this theory *âsti* and *nâsti* (*is* and *is not*) may be predicated of *Prameya* the objective aspect of knowledge or the process of apprehending an object. This dual predication must rest on *Svarupa* and *Pararupa* of *Prameya*. What is its *Svarupa* and what is its *Pararupa*: *Pararupa* of *Prameya* means *non-Prameya* anything other than *Prameya* we have no means of knowing. Hence the theory must fail in this case.

No, says the Logician. The state of being apprehended by knowledge-*Prameyatva* is the *Svarupa of Prameya*. This implies in general the *relation* of object to the knower anything besides this *relation*; even the object will be distinct from *Prameyatva* and hence will be the *Pararupa* in this context. Now this theory must be applicable to the ultimate existence or *Mahâsatta*. If *is* and *is not* are to be predicated of this *Summum Genus* what are its *Svarupa* and *Pararupa*? For the latter cannot be, as there can be no other form or matter or place or time not included in this. The *pararupa* of *Mahâsatta* need not imply the existence of other things besides itself; that would be self-contradictory. But still we can speak of its *Pararupa* when we contemplate something which falls short of the all-comprehensive universal. Any of its parts will be so far the negation of whole—its *Pararupa*.

Now *asti*, affirmation depends on self; *nâsti*, negation, on other things. *Asti* which is conditioned by self can very well belong to a thing. But if *nâsti* which is conditioned by other than the Jar e. g. is also predicated of the Jar, then it would imply that the Jar participates in the nature of its other—say cloth. This will lead to mere confusion.

This objection also is based on a misapprehension. Affirmation no doubt rests on the nature of the self the Jar. The negation resting on another thing—*Pata* (cloth) does not mean that the Jar also has the nature of a cloth. That would be absurd. The clear cut boundary between things will vanish and with it all knowledge. *Asti*—implies self assertion, *nâsti* implies alien-exclusion. A thing not only asserts its own individuality, but also repulses anything alien to it. It is this element of repulsion that everything must have in order to be real that entitles it to have the negative predicate. Instead of leading to a confusion this element of differentiation is the only basis for self-assertion of a thing. *Asti* and *nâsti*, assertion and exclusion, are inalienably present in the same thing. Wherever there is *asti*, there is *nâsti* and wherever there is *nâsti*, there is *asti* also.

Now this association of these two, *asti* and *nâsti*—in the same thing appears quite unwarranted. For on the one hand when we perceive a Jar we see mere *asti* without *nâsti* and on the other hand in the case of certain impossible and unreal concepts such as ass's horns, sky-flower there is mere *nâsti* without *asti*.

This is not quite correct. In the case of any perceived object *násti* does not mean that the thing should not exist as such and yet be perceived. That would be meaningless. *Násti* means nothing more than that element of repulsion and differentiation which isolates a thing from its background and gives it a determinate and positive nature. In this sense *nâsti* is inseparable from *asti* and it is the sense in which it is used. As to the other case of impossible and unreal concepts where is the positive foundation. If sky-flower is quite real; nay if it has a slight positive basis it will cease to mean an unreal and an impossible thing. Its nature seems to be pure negation and nothing less than that. This cannot be, answers our Logician. How can there be any negation without any significance. A significant negation must have some positive basis; otherwise it will be mere nonsense. The elements constituting the concept are by themselves real and are justified by the canons of experience. We have seen horns in a cow; we have seen an ass or a horse. These are existing and real. But the fanciful combination of an ass with horns or a flower with sky is unreal. But for the experience of horns on the head of a cow or flower in a tree there can be no talk of an ass with horns or a flower in the sky. Without this positive basis of experience there will no elements to make up even a fanciful complex. Thus even the fanciful ideas of *unicorn* and centaur must have some foundation in our experience. Again in the proposition "*Syadasti* Jiva" the terms *asti*, and Jiva (life) must mean identically the same thing or different things. If the meanings are of the same nature then one cannot be predicated of the other as a pot cannot be the predicate of a Jar both being coordinate. Further *asti* or existence is predicable of everything real. If *asti* is identical with Jiva then Jiva also must be predicated of everything. But if Jiva is different from *asti* then there is no chance of predicating *asti* of Jiva for they are entirely different from each other. Further Jiva being different from *asti* and *asti* being the predicate of everything, Jiva cannot be related to anything real; (i.e.) Jiva would become unreal. You cannot maintain that Jiva though different from *asti* can be said to have the predicate by a process of combination with it; for combination is impossible in the case of repelling elements.

The horns of this dilemma are blunted by *syadvâda*. These results need not frighten the Logician to whom *asti* and Jiva are

identical from the *dravyartha* view and different from *paryartha* view. They are different and yet identical. But for this dual nature there can be no predication at all.*

The primary modes of predication are three—*Syâdasti, syannasti, syadavaktavyah.* The other four are obtained by combining these three. Now according to *sankhya* philosophy everything is real and therefore exists. According to *Buddhism* everything is momentary and unreal. Both these views are rejected by the Jainas as extremes. The former is true according to the principle of *Dravyarthika* point of view; the latter is true according to *paryayarthika* point of view. Hence each is true in its own way and is not true absolutely. Again reality is indescribable according to the *Vedantins* who emphasise the *nirvachaniya* aspect of reality. Even this is only partially true, for otherwise even this predication "that Reality is indescribable" will be impossible.

The same seven modes of predication may be obtained in the case of following pairs of attributes; eternal and changing, one and many, universal and particular, etc. These pairs of opposites can very well be predicated of reality and these may yield the other derivative modes of predication. Thus practically every attribute by being affirmed and denied according to different aspects may bring about seven fundamental propositions true of real subject.

It may be said that after all this principle of *Saptabhangi* is a wanton indulgence in meaningless self-contradiction. This objection has been sufficiently answered above. This is not a case of wanton paradox or purposeless pun. If the words are wantonly misinterpreted or understood in an unwarranted sense then it may be charged with wanton quibbling; for example in the statement that this person has a new woollen shawl (*nava kambala*) the term *nava* may be taken to mean also *nine.* Though the word is capable of such an interpretation still in this statement it does not mean that. In spite of the context if a person retorts that assertion by saying, "this person cannot have nine shawls as he is very poor," it would be wanton quibbling. There is no such wanton quibbling underlying *Saptabhangi.*

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* [This discussion from Saptabhangitarangini reminds us of Bradley's discussion of the theory of Predication—in appearance and Reality.)

If it is not wanton quibbling it must merely be an expression of doubt. To say a thing may be as well as may not be is to exhibit one's own doubt and ignorance. At the best therefore the doctrine is a mode of scepticism. This charge of scepticism is certainly unfounded. Doubt expresses absence of determinate knowledge. If the *prima facie* appearance of a thing leads you to two different interpretations of which alternatives we cannot choose the right one then there is doubt as to its nature. Since its exact nature is unknown scepticism may be the result. But in the case of the contradictory propositions forming the basis of Saptabhangi we have two different aspects each serving as the basis of one of the propositions. Hence there is neither doubt nor confusion in this case. Each assertion is definite and clear.

SANKARA AND SYADVADA.

Thibaut's Translation of the *Bhâshya*.

"This doctrine we meet as follows:—Your reasoning, we say, is inadmissible 'on account of the impossibility in one thing.' That is to say, it is impossible that contradictory attributes such as being and non-being should at the same time belong to one and the same thing; just as observation teaches us that a thing cannot be hot and cold the same moment. The seven categories asserted by you must either be so many and such or not be so many and such; the third alternative expressed in the words 'they either are such are not such' results in a cognition of indefinite nature which is no more a source of true knowledge than doubt is. If you should plead that the cognition that a thing is of more than one nature is definite and therefore a source of true knowledge, we deny this. For the unlimited assertion that all things are of a non-exclusive nature is itself something, falls as such under the alternative predications 'somehow it is' 'somehow it is not' and so ceases to be a definite assertion. The same happens to the person making the assertion and to the result of the assertion; partly they are, partly they are not. As thus the means of knowledge, the object of knowledge, the knowing subject, and the act of knowledge are all alike indefinite, how can the Tirthankara (Jina) teach with any claim to authority and how can his followers act on a doctrine the matter of which is altogether indeterminate? Observation shows that only when a course of action is known to have a definite result people set about it without hesitation.

Hence a man who proclaims a doctrine of altogether indefinite contents does not deserve to be listened to any more than a drunken man or a madman. Again, if we apply Jaina reasoning to their doctrine of the five categories, we have to say that on one view of the matter they are five and on another view they are not five; from which latter point of view it follows that they are either fewer or more than five. Nor is it logical to declare the categories to be indescribable. For if they are so, they cannot be described; but, as a matter of fact they are described so that to call them indescribable involves a contradiction. And if you go on to say that the categories on being described are ascertained to be such and such, and at the same time are not ascertained to be such and such, and that the result of their being ascertained is perfect knowledge or is not perfect knowledge, and that imperfect knowledge is the opposite of perfect knowledge or is not the opposite; you certainly talk more like a drunken or insane man than like a sober, trustworthy person. If you further maintain that the heavenly world and final release exist or do not exist and are eternal or non-eternal, the absence of all determinate knowledge which is employed in such statement will result in nobody's acting for the purpose of gaining the heavenly world and final release. And moreover it follows from your doctrine that soul, non-soul and so on, whose nature you claim to have ascertained, and which you describe as having existed from all eternity, relapse all at once into the condition of absolute indetermination. As therefore the two contradictory attributes of being and non-being cannot belong to any of the categories—being excluding non-being and *vice versa* non-being excluding being—the doctrine of the Arhat must be rejected."

"RAMANUJA AND SAPTABHANGI."

Thibaut's Translation.—With the help of this they prove that all things—which they declare to consist of substance (dravya), and paryaya-to be existing one and permanent in so far as they are substances, and the opposite is so far as they are paryayas. By paryaya they understand the particular states of substances, and as those are of the nature of Being as well as Non-being, they manage to prove existence, non-existence and so on. With regard to this the *sutra* remarks that no such proof is possible. 'Not so, on account of the impossibility in one; i.e., because contradictory

attributes such as existence and non-existence cannot at the same time belong to one thing, not any more than light and darkness. As a substance and particular states qualifying it—and (by the Jainas) called paryaya—are different things (padartha) one substance cannot be connected with opposite attributes. It is thus not possible that a substance qualified by the part iular state, such as existence, should at the same time be qualified by the opposite state, i.e., non-existence. The non-permanency, further of a substance consists in its being the abode of those particular states which are called origination and destruction; how then should permanency, which is of an opposite nature, reside in the substance at the same time? Difference (bhinnatva), again consists in things being the abodes of contradictory attributes; non-difference, which is the opposite of this, cannot hence possibly reside in the same things which are the abode of difference; not any more than the generic character of a horse and that of a buffalo can belong to one animal. But (the Jaina may here be supposed to ask the Vedantin) how can you maintain that Brahman, although one only, yet at the same time is the self? Because we reply, the whole aggregate of sentient and non-sentient beings constitutes the body of the supreme person, omniscient, omnipotent and so on. And that the body and the Person embodied and their respective attributes are of totally different nature (so that Brahmana is not touched by the defects of this body), we have explained like-wise. Moreover, as your six substances, soul and so on are not one substance and one paryaya, their being one substance and so on, cannot be used to prove their being one and also not one and so on. And if it should be said that those six substances are such (viz., one and several, and so on) each owing to its own paryaya and its own nature, we remark that then you cannot avoid contradicting your own theory of everything being an ambiguous nature. Things which stand to each other in the relation of mutual non-existence cannot after all be identical. Hence the theory of the Jainas is not reasonable."

These two passages are quoted from the two great Hindu Commentators of Vedanta Sutras, Sankara and Ramanuja. The Sutra that is commented on is "*Neikasminnasambhavat*" (Ch. I. Pada 2 Su. 33.)

The author of the Vedanta Sutras as well as the commentators reject the Saptabhangi naya on the ground of the

impossibility of contradictory attributes inhering in the same thing.

All that is said above by way of exposition and discussion would vindicate the claim of Saptabhangi against the charges brought against it by these scholars. Our account would be incomplete if these charges are not examined in this connection.

Now the author of the Sutras does not give any detailed reasons besides the one contained in the Sutra itself—that a thing cannot have self-contradictory attributes. *Asti* and *nasti*, being and non-being, or affirmation and negation being contradictory epithets cannot be referred to the same thing. Hence the doctrine of such a predication is futile. This reasoning though short is interesting and suggestive. We have already pointed out the philosophical attitude adopted by the Jainas. A thing being of complex nature, having *dravya* and *paryaya* must be an identity in difference. Instead of rejecting the doctrine of reality for the reason given they seem to claim that the real is real only because of such a capacity to comprehend and reconcile the differences in itself. Here we are reminded of Bradley's polemic against "the nature of things." Though he admits the Hegelian doctrine of identity in difference he cannot forget the scholastic traditions about identity and difference. Every concrete thing or person is according to Bradley a Unity in diversity, and identity in difference a constant which is varying also. Now Bradley argues that such a nature implies self-contradiction and internal conflict. This is so because it is not possible for us to know how the difference could be derived from and related to an identity. Hence he condemns such things to the limbo of appearances.

We have been suggesting the similarity between the Hegelian doctrine of identity and the Jaina doctrine of *Asti-nasti*. But we must raise a note of warning that the Jaina doctrine does not accept wholesale Hegelian metaphysics. Unlike Bradley the greatest living representative of Hegelian absolutism the Jainas emphasize this important aspect of reality. The reason which is employed by Bradley to condemn a thing to be appearance is the very reason which serves the Jaina thinkers to proclaim the reality of the same.

The commentators deserve special attention. Hence we shall examine their criticism in detail. Sankara's criticism is of three main stages. First he tries to point out the intrinsic impossibility

of this doctrine. Second its practical futility. Third its conflict with many other Jaina doctrines. Being and non-being cannot be predicated of the same thing just as it is impossible to predicate hot and cold of the same. Mutually contradictory and conflicting attributes cannot exist together of the same thing at the same time. This objection appears to be unanswerable but if we remember the two different aspects of self-relation and other relation we can very easily see that the objection does not hold good. Very often even in ordinary experience we have examples of co-existing attributes which are in the abstract self-contradictory. The branches of a tree may be in motion, but the tree as a whole may not budge an inch. Here the tree is moving and yet is not moving. The same individual person may be father in relation to X and son in relation to Y. In this case we cannot reasonably ask how can the same individual be both father and son. The two conflicting attributes of fatherhood and sonhood are quite intelligible in the same individual. Similarly a class which is genus with reference to its own species may itself be a species in relation to its own higher genus. We need not multiply instances. It would be quite idle to maintain the impossibility of incompatible attributes in one and the same-thing. It is a matter of surprise to us modern readers how such an acute thinker like Sankara should go without observing the particular aspect from which the rival presents his case.

After appealing to experience to substantiate his point Sankara brings in the charge of indefiniteness against the doctrine of Saptabhangi. On a previous occasion we replied to this charge of indefiniteness. It is enough here to show that if by definiteness Sankara means unconditional and absolute assertion indefiniteness instead of being a defect would be certainly a meritorious point to the credit of Syadvada. In the course of the discussion the critic indulges in certain epithets which we should now call "unparliamentary." We may pass it without notice partly because of its irrelevency to the main argument and partly because of the fact that in his days such an intermixture of Logic and Rhetoric was perhaps accepted as a justifiable weapon of debate.

As to his second point the practical futility of the doctrine we have to say a word. His argument comes to this. Every theoretical doctrine has a practical bearing. This is all the more so in

the case of Indian thinkers. All Indian philosophers in spite of their doctrinal differences accept this as the fundamental truth of philosophy that metaphysical research is the handmaid of ethico-religious ideal of securing the *summum bonum* of life. Hence any doctrine that is indefinite and ambiguous in its message is condemned by this pragmatic test. Since we have not accepted the theoretical charge of ambiguity we need not tarry long at this practical consequence.

Next let us go to the application of Saptabhangi to the other Jaina doctrines such as the five categories and the final release with the consequent heavenly bliss. Sankara points out that according to this logic the five *astikayas* may be five and may not be five. This result will not certainly nonplus the Jaina logician. If they are severally referred to they are five. If they are referred to as an aggregate and a class they are one. If they are classified according to a different principle they may be two, living and non-living. Hence there is no fixed numerical characterisation of these categories. Variation in the number that may be used to designate these categories instead of implying self-contradiction indicates only a variation in the point of view from which they are examined. As the climax of his criticism Sankara asks his rival to say what would become of the heavenly world if it both exists and does not, both eternal and non-eternal. His rival will only answer as the author of Saptabhangi Tarangini does in the following manner. If as you say it must be one of those and not both you have the following difficulty. If the final release and heavenly bliss is eternal and existing where is the chance for Samsara and the attempt to obtain moksha. It the other alternative is the only truth what is the purpose of preaching such an ideal which is altogether impossible. "Man partly is and wholly hope to be" is not mere poetry. It is genuine philosophy. Inasmuch as the final release is the goal towards which the whole creation moves it is true and real and inasmuch as it is the goal and is not yet an actualised fact it is not real and true. Why should this doctrine be so vehemently attacked passes our understanding.

When we go to Ramanuja we have got a different method of argument altogether. He seems to accept the rival doctrine all the while protesting. He clearly sees the distinction between *dravya* and *paryaya*, substance and mode. He also perceives that *paryaya* means change and *dravya* permanency. He also correctly points

out that the doctrine of Syadvada is based upon these two different aspects Dravya and Paryaya. The proper course for the critic having gone so far would be to accept the doctrine. Or if he wants to reject he must show that things do not have both these aspects *dravya* and *paryaya*. Instead of doing either Ramanuja attempts to defend the Sutra on a principle which is quite indefensible and unwarranted. What he proves is that *asti* and *nâsti* cannot be predicated of a thing from the *dravya* point alone. According to him the same substance cannot have both predicates. Certainly, it cannot have. Jaina Logic too proclaims the same thing. But if you take the thing in both its aspects—and it must be so taken to avoid empty abstractions—then it can and must have both the predicates.

Attempting to reject this doctrine of identity in difference Ramanuja has the insight to perceive how his own doctrine of Vedanta is affected. In one sense the Vedantic metaphysics is the doctrine of the one and the many. If reality could be one and the many at the same time Vedantism would be sufficient argument in favour of Syadvada. But unlike Sankara who dismisses the Many as Maya Ramanuja as constrained by his metaphysical attitude accepts the reality of the many also. Then what becomes of the one in the many. He proposes the *purva paksha* for the Jains, "But how can you maintain that Brahman although one only yet at the same time is the self of all." He answers the *purva paksha* thus—"The whole aggregate of sentient and non-sentient beings constitutes the body of the Supreme Person and that the body and the person are of totally different nature." This is extremely dubious victory. If the body constituted by finite things and persons is really the manifestation or parinama of the Brahman and this what Ramanuja believes, then his refuge is quite unsafe. For, his rival would be justified in asking whether the parinama or the body is real or illusory. If the latter, his commentary becomes an unnecessary reduplication of Sankara's and if the former he is bound to admit the Syadvada point of view that the real is one from the point of view of the Person and many from the point of view of parinama or his body.

For a fuller discussion of the same we refer the reader to the excellent work Saptabhangitarangini from which we have freely drawn in this essay.

One other point and we may take leave of this topic.

Bertrand Russell in his American lectures "On Logical atomism" develops Menrong's Theory of objective fact in a very suggestive way. According to Menrong every proposition either true or false has an objective fact as the basis. For in order that there may be an intelligent assertion apart from its truth value their must be some objective basis. This doctrine implies two sets of objective facts one for true propositions and other for false ones. Both being objective, what isthe destined mark of each so that one stands for truth and the other for error? Thus the question of truth is pushed further without being answered and we have to admit objective facts which are false and erroneous. In order to avoid this result Russell proposes a modification in the doctrine.

He distinguishes between the meaning of a name and the fact implied by a proposition. Any individual object may be designated by a name. The name is a symbol refering to some particular object. This is a bare fact. There is no meaning in calling this true or false. It simply is. Truth or falsity refers to a proposition. A proposition becomes true or false because of an objective fact. The term objective fact is used in the sense of that which is other than the proposition that makes for its truth or falsity. Every objective fact may have two propositions of which one is true because it corresponds to the fact and the other is false because it has no corresponding fact. This theory of correspondence works well in the case of a true affirmative proposition (i.e.) of the pair of propositions based on each fact if the true one is affirmative, it is so because there is a corresponding fact. The negative proposition which is not corresponding to that fact is so far falsified by the fact. But take the following pair. Socrates is living and Socrates is not living. Here it is the negative proposition that is true and the affirmative one is false. According to Russel's theory the negative proposition which is true must have a corresponding fact; otherwise it cannot be true. But what is the objective fact that is corresponding to this proposition——'Socrates is not living.' There seems to be none and yet there must be one. Therefore Russell brings in the theory of "negative fact." This suggestion raised a lot of discussion among the audience. But Russel himself leaves it undeveloped. He emphasises the fact that negative facts must be accepted as a fundamental postulate if the correspondence theory is to work.

Now what have we in the above doctrine of Saptabhangi? Each thing is capable of having seven modes of predication and primarily two, affirmative and negative. The affirmative proposition is determined by self form, matter, place and time. The negative proposition rests on non-self relation of the same four form, matter, place and time. In this case both the propositions are true. A negative proposition in the case of self-relation and affirmative proposition in the case of non-self-relation would both be false. The proposition relating Socrates to his own time is true; the one relating him to any other time is false. To say that he is living now is such a false proposition. We are entitled to say only this that he is not living now.

Thus we have something like this. A thing in its Svarupa (self-form), svadravya, (matter), svakshetra (place) svakala (time) is the positive fact enabling the truth of an affirmative proposition. The thing in its pararupa (non-self-form), paradravya parakshetra, parakala will constitute the negative fact. This will justify the negative proposition. This is offered only by way of suggestion for a possible explanation of what Russell calls "negative fact." Neither do we propose to develope Russell's theory nor do we want to imply that he was anticipated by Indian logicians of old. Any how the comparison is interesting and suggestive.

This Saptabhangi is a powerful organon in the hands of Syadvadins who avoided the Nihilism of the Buddhists as well as the absolute Monism of the Vedantists, who steered clear of the shallow realism of the Charvakas and the ludicrous idealism of the Nayavadins.

Spiritual Experience and Reality.

AN attempt is made in this essay to analyse epistemologically the content of spiritual experience and determine its value as revelation of Reality. The mystic and the philosopher, nay, even the man in the street very often escapes from the vexatious cares and anxieties of everyday life and withdraws within himself to hear the nobler part of his ego. During these moments, the soul experiences supreme joy and harmony. Such experiences of self-transcendence are common when one is disinterestedly enjoying a work of art or gazing with rapt devotion at the image of

some deity. But the scope of this article is limited to the consideration of some of the general features of spiritual experiences which find articulate expression in philosophical conceptions and judgments about Reality. Our exposition of the central theme may profitably be prefaced by a few words on the mode of treating such problems.

Pragmatism teaches that to arrive at a proper evaluation of metaphysical concepts and ideas, it is essential to conduct a preliminary investigation into the logical and psychological factors involved in them. For this enables us to see whether they are in consonance with the system of organised knowledge or not. The universal judgments of philosophy like the universal judgments of science must be the products of deliberate reflection and intuition as well. And we require an independent criterion to test their scope and validity. Thus when we designate certain types of experience as spiritual it is not without significance that we have qualified and enrichod the concept of experience. We come to appreciate this only when we begin to analyse the elements of spiritual experience and see how they function in throwing light on the nature of reality.

To start with, a purely verbal interpretation of spiritual experience will not carry us very far in explaining its relation to reality. Because this would only lead to the conclusion that in all instances of experiencing the spirit is active or to express the same in the terminology of modern psychology, there is the manifestation of the activity of mind or intellect. But every form of experience is also the experience of something, of an objective. And it is open to us to describe experience by the quality of the object. Subject and object are thus the indispensable constituents of human experience and a true apprehension of their relative and diverse natures helps us to get over the rigid opposition between matter and spirit, held by Platonists and Dualists, alike. As our analysis has shown, even sensuous experiences, i.e., experiences of matter and motion are and must be the products of the activity of the spirit.

But this mode of literal interpretation hardly enables us to understand the intrinsic nature of spiritual experience. To answer our purpose we must approach the problem in a different way. We are aware that subject and object are the basic constituents of experience. But while the subject is constant, object varies. In

other words, the latter is contingent and it is to the variation and contingency of the object that the complexity of experiences is due. However, we do not dignify all the variety of experience as spiritual just because the subject or spirit is a constant factor in them all. On the contrary, our experiences are all characterised by the attributes or the object. If this be true, a spiritual experience ought to be one in which the object like the subject is also spirit. That is, in all instances of spiritual experience, we have the phenomenon of spirit greeting spirit. It is on self trying to understand its own true nature. It is the soul communing with itself.

This kind of experience must be pure and universal; pure because the soul is learning its own true intrinsic nature without being engrossed in considerations other than those pertaining to itself; universal because in trying to understand its nature, it is at first unconsciously endeavouring to know the nature of the Universe, for reality is spirit or spiritual. The contingent is matter which is the sensuous and gross aspect of spirit and so subordinate to spirit.

Idealistic philosophy teaches that spirit is self and self is identical with reality. In the system of idealism which is the consummation of human reflection, spiritual experience occupies a pre-eminent place, for as our psychological analysis has discovered it is the only form through which spirit is experienced and spirit for idealism is reality. It is therefore perfectly clear why this system of philosophy should lay particular emphasis on the spiritual activity of human selves. Mysticism which in the spirit of its teaching is closely identical with idealism sets in the clearest light the fundamental importance of spiritual experience as the organ of reality. It teaches the complete identity of the individual self with a divine self postulated to be the substance of the Universe. The intuition or the perception of the divinity of selfhood constitutes the goal of all philosophic endeavour, and this state of exalted spiritual insight is always accompanied by that ineffable harmony which is characteristic of a complete and unified vision of universe. Thus the spiritual experience of the mystic is essentially a pure intuition attended with pleasure. There is the joy of the individual soul realising its universal nature. This is supreme realisation or *Ananda*; The state in which the unity of

spirit to the universal life becomes a fact and results in indescribable bliss.

It is true that the spiritual experience about which we have discussed here is very similar to the Intuition of Henry Bergson. But we demur to the suggestion of complete identity on the ground that Bergson has no idea of ascribing to his intuition the exalted role which spiritual experience according to our description plays as the revelation of reality. He treats intuition as a concrete perception capable of being developed by all human beings and regards it as superior to intellect from a philosophical point of view because it is supposed to complement the findings of intellect. This is not the place to discuss the truth or otherwise of this claim but what is urged is that by spiritual experience we mean a higher kind of intuition than that of Bergson's. It is more allied to the insight, the vision of the mystic and the seer. It can be applied to those ideal moments of inspiration when they experience harmony in all things and realise the unity of the Universe. There the opposites are fused into a whole and perfect concord of matter and spirit attained. The soul enjoys a foretaste of God's peace and thrills with a longing for eternity.

We are now in a position to conclude that spiritual experience must be realisation of truth or reality. All truly great thinkers, philosophers and mystics must have had this mode of experience or realisation before they gave out their ideas to their fellowmen. Let us illustrate the truth of our contention by a few instances from European Philosophy, ancient and modern.

In his unflagging search after truth and in his passionate conviction of the ultimate victory of virtue over wickedness Socrates drew inspiration from the spirit he adored as the mother of his being. Plato was not a mere visionary beating his wings in vain in the realm of pure imagination as he is very often represented to be but an idealist imbued with an intense spiritual fervour. He realised that the reality that underlies this world of stress and strife must be permanent and transcendental. From his spiritual experience of the 'vision splendid' he finds that the visible world is a shadow, and transitory in character. He finally discovers the abode of reality in the region of non-sensuous universals or ideas from which our world derives its evanscent existence.

Whatever the truth of this philosophical theory may be, it was Plato's firm belief that the structure of Reality composed of concrete and permanent entities existed separate from the sphere of sensible phenomena. Among modern philosophers, again, instances are not wanting of those who have had an insight into the spirit that informs and animates this universe. To Hegel the whole cosmos is the evolution of the Absolute spirit. The latter at first a mere idea, materialises and expands and returns upon itself thus fulfilling the purpose of its being. The study of cosmic history shows him that all things are in the grip of spiritual evolution.

Bradley's rational intuition of Reality finds concrete expression in all reconciling-all-comprehensive Absolute which embraces and harmonises every conceivable imperfection and discord. He divines that final form of the universe to be a not quite incomprehensible absolute perfection which is the crown and completion of all things and the consummation of Truth, Beauty and Good.

These instances suffice to prove the fact that spiritual experience forms the background of all our intellectual judgments about reality, in the absence of which the latter are worthless. But we do not for a moment assert that spiritual experience exhausts or completely reveals the nature of Reality. Shankar's characterization of Reality as NetiNeti has pointed reference to the finite limitations of the human intellect. In a real sense ultimate reality is unknowable, for as Mr. Bradley says, if we could know reality completely then we should be omniscient. But this is not to say that we do not know anything about the nature of the Real. The characteristics of our highest and purest experience must certainly qualify it, for otherwise it will have no bearing or relation to ourselves. Since self or spirit is the highest category of human experience we are certainly right in regarding reality as self. And whatever more it possesses it possesses by remaining a self and not by negating its selfhood.

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Bangalore.

Do animals live after death.*

Is the sea of Immortality confined to the souls of human beings?

By Horatio Bottomley, M.P. (Editor of "John Bull.")

Following up his article of last week, on "The Faith Within Us All," Mr. Bottomley now considers the problem of the immortality of the higher animals.

LAST week I wrote of the Faith Within us All—the faith, or, as I preferred to call it, the instinct, universal amongst mankind, that somewhere beyond the grave there is an after-life, capable for a time of earth contact, and then either vivifying another body or returning, with all the qualities acquired whilst in human captivity, into the great sea of Immortality which flows all round the world. The article has aroused widespread interest and has brought me an enormous amount of correspondence—all of which I will consider carefully before returning to the subject a little later on.

* * *

To-day I want to deal with another, and a kindred, branch of the same problem. Is the Sea of Immortality closed to the spirits of all except the Human race, or does it attract to itself, after what we call Death, that which, for convenience, I will call the souls of the higher members of the animal world? But if amongst you, my dear readers, there be some who will at once declare that in speaking of the "souls" of animals I am begging the question, I will substitute the phrase, Vital Force—just to preserve the distiction between "the lower orders of creation" and our noble and exalted selves!

* * *

What consummate egoists we are! Do you remember how Byron rebuked us? Listen to this—from his Epitaph on a Newfoundland dog:

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* From "Sund ay Illustrated" July 10, 1921.

The poor dog, in life the dearest friend,
The first to welcome, foremost to defend,
Whose honest heart is still his master's own,
Who labours, fights, lives, breathes for him alone,
Unhonoured falls, unnoticed all his worth,
Denied in heaven the soul he held on earth;
While man, vain insect! hopes to be forgiven,
And claims himself a sole exclusive heaven.

* * *

And now, if you please, we will continue with our theme. Do animals, or, at any rate, the higher forms of them, live after "death"? *Of course they do.* Why shouldn't they? Do you think that we men and women possess a monopoly of every virtue which makes for nobility of character and immortality of soul? To quote Byron once more, of how many human beings could it be written that they "possessed Beauty without vanity—Courage without ferocity—and Strength without insolence"? Let us for a moment consider some of the attributes of the dog which place him on a par with the best of us.

* * *

What about Love and Loyalty—two of the finest traits in human nature? As I asked in a recent article, did you ever know a dog *pretend* to like a person; and that adds Sincerity to his nature. And Courage—what dog (and the dog is typical of the higher animal world) will not fight in defence of his master—even to the death! And Obedience and Discipline, and a full sense of wrong-doing. They are all there. And I am not sure that one writer puts it too high when he says:

"It may be doubted whether any woman even has ever achieved a higher level of self-sacrificing devotion than has been found in some dogs, or any man more courage than that of the small tom-tit, who will fearlessly attack a human being a thousand times his own size."

* * *

And let it be remembered that there is no fundamental distinction between the physical composition of the higher animals and man—both consisting of millions of cells which are indistinguishable under the strongest microscope; whilst from a biological and physiological point of view, the identities are remarkable. And if you refer me to the great distinction, gift of

speech, my reply is that there you hit upon the one stage of development which differentiates us, and of which the higher animal is so conscious that, as you look into his eyes, his very soul cries out to you.

* * *

So, my dear Mr. Materialist, who are you to tell me that this dog of mine, my faithful friend of years, who understands my every mood and would rather die than be disloyal, is to perish miserably—"like a dog," as you would say—and that no spark of that wonderful love and loyalty is to survive? Surely I am as entitled to my wistful belief as you to your cold negation. One thing I do know: many dogs *deserve* immortality and the joys of a future life far more than some human beings. Moreover, there is nothing in the whole realm o. science or philosophy to disprove my theory. If we leave aside the religious sentiment altogether, every argument that can be adduced in support of human immortality can be applied with equal force to the higher animal creation. What *is* Life? That is the ultimate riddle that has baffled man's searching enquiry through all the ages. Is it a vital essence that can exist and survive apart from its physical mechanism? If so, there is no reason to differentiate the animal from the human. The dog is as good as his master; and the life of neither is necessarily bounded by the grave.

* * *

Do you know how widely the belief in a future state for animals is held? Needless to say that in the East—whence come all religions—it is a recognised article of faith, the Buddhists and the Theosophists having a very definite theory as to the various qualities of soul, or Kharma, which are evolved in the different grades of existence. But we need not go so far away. The early Greek philosophers—from whom so much of our wisdom has descended—were practically unanimous on the subject, whilst our own Bishop Butler tells us that "we cannot find anything throughout the whole analogy of nature to afford us even the slightest presumption that animals ever lose their living powers." Byron, as we have seen, was emphatic in his belief, and so were Luther and Shelley; and Wesley and Southey; and Cowper and Keble and Pope; and Kingsley and Dean Stanley, and a host of other famous thinkers.

* * *

So here's to St. Anthony—the Patron Saint of the "Lower Orders." And if ever I am in Rome on his "Day," I shall certainly attend the Benediction of Beasts, to which every man who owns a dog, or horse, or beast of any kind, sends it to be blessed.

* * *

And do you know that in olden days all animals were considered amenable to the law, and that whole communities sometimes prosecuted them and sentenced them to death or other penalties; whilst even the lowest forms of creation, such as the scarab beetle, were invested with all kinds of mystic attributes.

* * *

So come, my friends, do not let us give ourselves such airs, and graces. We are not the only pebbles on the beach of the sea of Immortality.

Digambar Jain Vernacular Periodicals.

THE Digambar Jain Community possesses a fairly good periodical Literature, so far as its quantity is concerned. We propose to discuss herein the quality of the same.

1. *The Jain Hitaishi.* This is in its 15th year. It is the best monthly conducted in Hindi, and the Jain community may well be proud of it. It was started by Pandit Nathu Ram Premi, a Jain scholar of sound religiou's learning and wide views, with the object of promoting a critical and historical study of Jain Religion, Philosophy, and Literature, and during the last 15 years it has been successful in maintaining its policy. For some years past, Pandit Jugal Kishore, a retired legal practitioner has taken up the Editorial responsibility, and we are glad to say that the excellent style and solid worth of the Journal has ever been progressing onwards. It supplies its readers with 32 pages of closely printed matter, containing good readable stuff, and cause for further study and reflection on the subjects dealt with.

It is the ouly Jain Vernacular Journal which deserves to be, and is, permanently preserved, and contains valuable articles of perennial interest and substantial worth.

2. *The Digambar Jain.* This is in its 14th year. It is edited by Seth Mulchand Krishnadas Kapadia, and is published from his

Jain Vijaya Press in Surat. It is a bilingual monthly, containing 32 pages of readable subject matter, in Hindi and Gujrati. It condenses all important news affecting the Digambar Jains. Its annual Deep-malika number contains articles in English also by leading and eminent Jain Scholars, and some illustrations. It is a special feature, and no other Journal possessed by Digambar Jains has approached near it in this respect.

3. *Padmavati Puruwal.* This is a recently started monthly It takes its name from a sub-caste, the members of which generally profess the Jain religion. It is edited from Calcutta by Pandit Srilal, a scholar of Sanskrit Literature, and Jain Religion and Philosophy. We regret that the high talents of Pandit Srilal have been confined to the editing of a sub-caste organ. They should have found a wider scope and a liberal field of action.

4. *Jain Siddhant.* We have received stray copies of this monthly, edited by Pandit Bansidhar from Sholapur. It professes to be an organ of the Shastriya Parishad a recently established coterie of "Jain Pandits" of varying literary attainments. Its outlook seems rather narrow and confined to preconceived notions.

5. *Jaiswal Jain.* This is edited by Shriyut Mahendra from Agra. The opening verse on the 1st page lays down its policy, as the promotion of unity in the Jain community, the rejection of evil customs, and encouragement to proper action. Although a caste organ, we find it to be liberal and Catholic in its views.

6. *Gola Purba Jain.* This is another sub-caste monthly; edited by Pandit Munnalal and published from Sangor. We have never received any issue of this, and can offer no critical opinion beyond saying that we extremely regret the advent of caste Journals. They serve to accentuate differences, and disintegrate the community.

7. *Jain Martand.* Another Hindi monthly edited by Lala Misrilal Sogani from Hathras. We never received any copy of this. We have known Lala Misilal as a young man who was once connected with the office of the Digambar Jain Mahasabha, and who attained popularity as a singer of Bhajans. We do not know his literary attainments.

8. *Jati Prabodhak.* This is edited from Jhansi by Shriyut Vishwambhardas Gargiya. It was started as a private venture by the late Babu Dayachandra Goeliya, B.A., with the object of promoting social reform in the Jain community, and was ably and

earnestly edited by him. After his sudden and untimely death in 1918, the Journal was taken over by its present editor. It has suffered very seriously by the death of the promising young gentleman who gave it birth, and may better be discontinued now.

9. *The Satyodaya* is edited by Babu Chandra Sen Jain Vaidya from Etawah. This also does not serve much useful purpose.

10. *Jain Pradeep.* This monthly is edited in Urdu by Shriyut Jyoti Prasada from Deoband. It discusses social topics generally in a liberal spirit, and is ably edited. It is the best and oldest Journal conducted for the benefit of those who know Urdu, and are not well versed in Hindi.

11. *Jain Pracharak.* Is the Urdu monthly organ of the Jain orphanage at Delhi, and has been discharging its mission satisfactorily.

12. *Jain Bhodak* ably edited in Gujrati by Seth Raoji Sakharam Doshi, an eminent scholar.

13. *Pragati and Jina Vijaya.* Conducted in Marathi from Kolahpur.

14. *Khandelwal Jain Hitechhu.* An organ of Khandelwal Mahasabha, this is another sub-caste Journal. It is published bi-monthly, from Bombay. It seems to revel in coarseness and vulgarity of language. We would advise the Khandelwal Mahasabha to direct the discontinuance of this mischief-making element in the community.

15. *Ahimsa,* a weekly edited by Br. Gyananand from Benares. It has our hearty support. Eminent writers have been contributing to make this newspaper a useful organ for promulgating the principles of Ahimsa, Love and Mercy for all Living Beings—human and sub-human.

16. *Jain Gazette,* edited weekly from Muttra by Pandit Raghunath Das of Sarnas. It is the organ of the Digambar Jain Mahasabha. We do not know from what College of Learning, the Editor received his literary degrees, but the editorial comments, notes, and articles, exhibit an utter lack of literary training, decent expression, and propriety of language, and the working of a strong bias and prejudice for preconceived notions, and an extreme intolerance of all fair criticism and discussion.

17. *Jaina Mitra.* This is called the weekly organ of the Digambar Jain Provincial Sabha, Bombay, and is edited in Hindi by Jain Dharma Bhushan Brahmchari Sital Prasada, and published from Surat by Seth Mulchand Kishandas Kapadia. It is, however, the best newspaper, the Digambar Jain Community possesses. Its editorial article on "Nischaya Dharma" meditation is a special feature, and is eagerly and anxiously expected by its readers, week after week. The interesting and instructive accounts of the travels of its Editor, and his critical notes on what he saw and noticed during his travels is another special feature which makes it extremely attractive and useful. The annual presents of standard books add considerably to its popularity. It is in its 22nd year now. It should be made a bi-weekly without much delay.

Ajit Prasada.

Reincarnation *

ALTHOUGH this doctrine is rejected throughout Europe and America by the Christians, it is accepted by the majority of mankind at this present day. It has been held as true by the mightiest Eastern nations. The ancient civilization of Egypt was built upon this doctrine and it was handed over to Pythagoras, Empedocles, Plato, Virgil and Ovid who scattered it through Greece and Italy. It is the keynote of Plato's philosophy when he says that all knowledge is reminiscence. It was wholly adopted by the Neo Platonists like Plotinus and Proclas. The hundreds of millions of Hindoos, Buddhists and Jains have made that doctrine the foundation of their philosophy, religion, government and social institutions. It was a cardinal point in the religion of the Persian unagi. The doctrine of Metempsychosis was an essential principle of the Druid faith and was impressed upon your forefathers, the Celts, the Gauls and the Britons. Among the Arab philosophers it was a favorite idea. The rites and ceremonies of the Romans, Druids and Hebrews expressed this truth forcibly. The Jews adopted it after the Babylonian captivity. John the Baptist was to them a second Eligah. Jesus was thought to be a re-appearance of John the Baptist or one of the old prophets. The Roman Catholic purgatory seems to be a make-shift, contrived to

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* By V. R. Gandhi—from his lecture delivered in America.

take its place. Philosophers like Kant, Schelling and Schopenhouer have upheld this doctrine. Theologians like Julius Muller, Dorner and Edward Beecher have maintained it. And to-day it reigns over the Burman, Siamese, Chinese, Japanese, Tartar, Tibetan East Indian and Ceylonese including at least 750 millions of mankind and nearly two thirds of the race. Is it not wonderful then that this great and grand philosophical deduction which the Hindus, Buddhists and Jains gave to the world centuries and centuries before the Christian Era should or could be blotted out of existence from the Western and European world by the soul-blighting and absurd dogmas of the dark ages that supervened. By the persecution of wise men and destruction of innumerable works in the library of Constantinople, the Church hierarchy managed to plunge the whole of Europe into mental darkness which has given the world the black record of the inquisition and the loss of millions of human lives through religious wars and persecutions.

What is reincarnation? Reincarnation is the doctrine that souls enter this life not as a fresh creation, but after a long course of previous existences and will have to pass through many before it reaches its final destination. Our age is the age of opinions. Instead of thinking ourselves, we allow others to think for us. If I can quote passages from Ralph Waldo, Emerson or from Lord Tennyson's poems or from the Bible in favour of a certain theory no argument will be necessary to prove it. But if I quote a passage from my Bible, you will say you wont believe in its truth and will ask me to prove my position logically. I will accept the challenge and prove the truth of my theory, not by a quotation from my Scriptures but logically. We know that the human body is a mechanism not a mechanism like a watch or a steam-engine but a knowing mechanism, able to control itself. It is controlled not by any external power but by a power within, which we call mind, soul, spirit or ego. The existence of this central power is disputed by none. Materialism declares this central power to be the property of matter, to be the product of molecular activities going on within the brain. This theory only explains how mechanical motions are produced on the brain cells. But machines only produce motions, not judgements. An amæba in search of food pursues no haphazard methods but makes most careful selections of the kind it wants. It will send out its pseudopodia, catch,

swallow and digest a struggling infusorium or other nutritious game; but a mere touch of a grain of sand satisfies it as to its character, when it thrusts it from it in a way that plainly says "That is not good." Oxygen consuming bacteria will cluster around grains of chlorophyl, if exposed to direct sunlight but pay no attention to them in the shade or darkness. They know when the oxygen is being given off. Infusoria guide themselves in hunting their food with apparently as much precision as fish. They avoid obstacles and sometimes undertake to move them out of the way. They reject the innutritious and take the nutritious. These facts, evidently teach that the central energy called the soul power is not the result of a nervous system but *vice versa*. In man this fact becomes most potent what particular motion among the molecules of the brain can be postulated as the physical equivalent and causal antecedent of our conceptions of justice, of truth, of moral obligation. The physical brain is limited to motion only, it cannot choose its own mode of motion even. What possible motion in the brain causes the idea I am I. This recognition of a real unit does not vary from the cradle to the grave. From childhood to old age, during the whole course of the total change of all brain molecules I am I is undisturbed. This I am I is the soul. It is this soul which makes memory possible. It has its own consciousness and not the consciousness of any one else, therefore it is a unit existing by itself. The law of the conservation of energy is true in the physical as well as in the spiritual world. Therefore as no atom can be created or destroyed, so also no soul-entity can be created or destroyed. What becomes of soul then after what we call death? No power in the universe can annihilate it. It must exist somewhere. In what state would it exist? Does it at once pass into spiritual existence? If so, there is no justice in hurling all the egos, good, bad or indifferent into spirituality without distinction. Spirituality itself means the existence of spirit pure and simple and there is no sense in asserting that all egos after death live in that state, when we know for a certainty that all of them have lived on this physical plane different kinds of life. Effects of good or bad acts committed on the physical plane must manifest on the psychical plane. The force created by the ego on the physical plane in this life must in some way or other manifest itself after death on the psyhcical plane—be in future life. And if the soul has to pass through other future

lives, is it unreasonable to say that it has passed through past lives also. If the soul was created at a time it must also die at death. Whatever begins in time must end in time. If the soul is immortal, it must be immortal at both its ends. It cannot be immortal at one end without being immortal at the other. The idea of special creation at birth implies the correlative of annihilation at death. It does not stand to reason that from an infinite history the soul enters this world for its first and only physical existence and then shoots off into an endless spiritual existence. As Emerson says:—We wake and find ourselves on a stair. There are other stairs below us which we seem to have ascended; there are stairs above us, many a one which go upward and out of sight.

Reincarnation is the only doctrine which gives a complete solution of the much-disputed question of original sin. There cannot be greater injustice in the world than the fact that I am suffering for transgression of my ancestor. Adonis responsibility for our sin is only a make-shift of the theologions. No one but the individual himself can be blamed for his wrong doing. Are not the courts of Law of your United States founded on the ideas of justice? Will any Judge sitting on the throne of justice be justified in accepting the death—the voluntary suicide of Mr. B. as the proper retribution for the murder committed by Mr. A. And if he does that, will not the same Judge be arraigned before a superior Court for having knowingly abetted the suicide of B. And still we are asked to believe that the guilt of one man can be washed by the suffering of another.

But the doctrine of reincarnation assists us most when we look at the inequality and injustice and evil of the world and seek for solution. Why is one man born rich and the other poor. Why is one man born in Central Africa among the cannibals and the other in the peaceful part of India. Why is Queen Victoria born to rule over territories on which the Sun never sets and why is a labourer of Burma born in Burma to work as a slave in an Englishman's tea-garden. What is the cause of this apparent injustice? Even those who believe in the personal creator of the universe must believe in this doctrine of re-incarnation in order to exonerate God from the charge of maliciousness. And now let us see if the Bible of Christendom assists in upholding this doctrine. In the proverbs of Solomon we find this passage—(Proverbs VIII. 22-31). Here all the passages except the last two

prove the pre-existence of soul, and not the creation at a certain time. The last two passages even prove a prior physical life. Let us turn to Jeremiah I 5. "Before I formed thee in the belly I knew thee; and before thou camest forth out of the womb I sanctified thee." This shows that the prophets too had existed before. Even in the New Testament there is sufficient evidence for reincarnation. In John IX 2 a question is put to Jesus by his disciples—Which did sin, this man or his parents that he was born blind? This refers to two popular theories of the time—one that of Moses who taught that the sins of fathers would descend on the children to the third and the fourth generation and the other that of reincarnation doctrine. He merely says that neither that man's sin nor his father's sin was the cause of his blindness; he does not deny the pre-existence of that man. For in Galatians Ch. VI 7 we find for whatever a man soweth that shall be also the reap. Paul does not here mean that what a man soweth in this physical existence that he shall reap in spiritual existence. For in the next passage he says:—For he that soweth to his flesh shall of the flesh reap corruption but he that soweth to the spirit shall of the spirit reap life ever lasting. Even the words of Jesus confirm the doctrine. In St. Mathew Ch. XI he says: Verily I say unto you among them that are born of women there has not risen a greater than John the Baptist: notwithstanding, he that is least in the kingdom of heaven is greater than he. And from the days of John the Baptist until now the kingdom of heaven suffereth violence, and the violent take it by force. For all the prophets and the law prophesied until John, and if ye will receive it this is Elias, which was for to come." Does not Jesus mean that John was reincarnated Elias.

It is useless to multiply instances taken from the Bible. For every candid Christian student must acknowledge that the truth of the doctrine of Reincarnation does not depend on a scriptural mention.

But some people may say—If this doctrine is true, how is it that we do not remember our past incarnations. I will ask such people—In what way do we exercise the faculty of memory? Certainly, so far as we are living in a body, we exercise it through the brain. In passing from one incarnation to the other, the soul does not carry its former brain in the new body. Even during the

the course of one life, do we always remember our past doings? Can any one remember that wonderful epoch, the infancy?

The doctrine of reincarnation is common to Hinduism, Buddhism and Jainism.

Out of these ideas all of them have constructed high codes of morality pretty nearly similar to one another.

Hindu Code by Dr. H. S. Gour.

IT is to be much regretted that a lawyer, and scholar of Dr. Gour's attainments should deem it fit to make in his Hindu Code, such prejudiced and uncharitable observations on Jainism as have greatly outraged the feelings of the Jains all over the country and called forth a strong and indignant protest from them. In a European scholar, the ignorance of the great religious systems of this country and their history may be excusable but in an Indian scholar, who has ample opportunity and innumerable facilities to study the religious and philosophical literature of the people of the land of his birth and living and to come in contact with them, it is simply deplorable, if not unpardonable. It is nothing short of foolhardiness on the part of a man to write what he does not know or care to know. A man who would aspire to make himself famous by writing on Hindu Law, must needs be a great scholar of Sanskrit fully initiated in all the mysteries of the great Sanskrit commentaries on the subject. The literature on Hindu Law in Sanskrit is very extensive and involves a life-time's study. The Jain literature is no less great. A man, who has not the patience and faith to wade through these massive literatures and attempts to write on them, would be rushing in where angels fear to tread.

One may simply wonder at the profound ignorance and audacity of the writer when he reads the observations made upon the Jain religion by him (writer). The following is a brief critical note on these objectionable remarks.

Page 180, Hindu Code.

The remarks of the writer that Agarwalas and Mahashweries are Orthodox Hindus while the last (Jains) being classed as Hindu heretics, are not accurate and betray the writer's ignorance about the Jains. There are thousands of Agarwalas who are Digambari

Jains. 'Heretics' in connection with the Jains is as unhappy a word as it is inaccurate. People believing in soul and laying down an elaborate system of spiritual exercises by which to attain to Godhood and all that it means, cannot be called heretics. Jainism does not represent a cleavage from Hinduism but is an independent religion, whose origin is lost in the very night of hoary antiquity. It has been evolved, elaborated and systematised by a series of mighty spiritual geniuses—the last of whom Lord Mahavira was an elderly contemporary of Lord Buddha as ancient history of India most pointedly shows.

Again the writer falls into a pit of error when he remarks that the Swetambaries worship their God clothed in costly raiments. In the first place, the word 'God' is not an appropriate word in this connection. The idea of the Godhood of the Jains differs widely from the idea that other religions entertain on the subject. They have no one God but twenty four Tirthankars who by their own holy exertions spread over infinite births attained to the emancipated state of Siddhas who may all be called Gods from our worldly point of view but who are all one in their emancipated state, there remaining nothing to separate them. While the Digambaries worship their Tirthankars in their aspects of Jivan-Muktas, the great emancipated Souls still dwelling in their mortal tenements, the Swetambaries worship them as they lived and moved among men, preaching holy doctrine and working for their spiritual upliftment. In the course of their holy mission, they were frequently worshipped with the highest honours that people could, out of their pious feelings, offer them, as people do even now in the case of their great Leaders. They, the spiritual Teachers, did not care for all those honours or princely gifts which were offered to them but people could not show their grateful feelings in any other way. Swetambaries worship these spiritual saviours in this aspect and put costly headdresses or coronets on their idols but their bodies remain unclad They are not dressed in raiments as the Hindu idols are and it being so, it cannot be said that they are clothed in costly raiments, which is calculated to give altogether a different idea or to suggest that they are dressed just in the same manner as Hindu idols are. A learned writer should so use his words as not to give a wrong idea about a thing, and Dr. Gour takes the least pains to make his statement accurate in this respect.

Another remark of the learned Doctor is that the hostility between the two sects—Digambaries and Swetambaries is as great as *theologicum odium* can reach, is a rigmarole of exaggeration. Perhaps the doctor could not resist the temptation of using a Latin expression, to show off his learning. The fact is that except a couple of legal disputes relating to the Parasnath Hill and Maksi temple, which are on the way of settlement, the relations between the two sects are harmonious and peaceful. Both the sects worship the same idols in the same temples according to their respective beliefs without any quarrel or dissension. It is an inexcusable exaggeration to say that they are bitterly hostile to each other. Such remarks, ostensibly conceived in no spirit of mischief or malice, are highly unjust to others and their uncharitableness is as obnoxious as their inaccuracy is inexcusable.

Page 190.

The remarks "Jainism claims to be the precursor of Buddhism, but it is only its child, etc., etc.," are totally wrong and betray the writer's abysmal ignorance of Jain religion. Some misinformed European scholars were of this view, but their wrong and prejudiced view has long been exploded by other European Orientalists who studied the subject and drew aright conclusions from their premises.

Drs. Lassen, Weber, M. Barth and other European scholars relying principally on the opinion of the famous Chinese traveller Huen Thsang, held the view that Jainism is an off-shoot of Buddhism. But a new light dawned upon the subject with the arrival of Drs. Buhler and Jacobi in the arena of controversy. Now there is not a single great scholar European or Indian, who holds this wrong view. The matter has now been placed beyond all controversy; and it is highly surprising that Dr. Gour comes forward at such a late hour to proclaim his knowledge of Jain religion to the world, relying on an old exploded theory. Had he cared to read what has been written by modern Orientalists on Jainism he would not have fallen into this pit, nor given a gratuitous insult to his fellow-countrymen. Even Dr. Colebrooke who belongs to the older generation of Orientalists places the date of this faith-Jainism in the 9th Century B. C. and attributes its origin to Parasnath, who could not have lived later than that time according to him. But this is not the whole truth—only a glimpse of it. Parasnath was twenty-third in succession of the great Tirthankars

who preached this religion. One can gauge the depth of its antiquity, when this fact is taken into consideration.

These passages from the Hindu Code form the most objectionable features of the book, and are nothing short of misrepresentations. They should be expunged out of the book in the interests of truth and fairplay. One fails to understand why an Indian scholar should misrepresent things in order to wound the sentiments of an important section of the people. The act is not worthy of a patriotic Indian nor justifiable from the point of view of an impartial and truth-loving historian. The agitation among the Jains to get these objectionable passages expunged out of the book is based on sound reasons, and it deserves to be taken into consideration by those in whose hands the remedy lies.

The Relative Antiquity of Jainism and Buddhism.

IN the following paragraphs we want to adduce some evidence to disprove the notion, which is still held by some men, that Jainism is an offshoot of Buddhism, and to prove that if one has branched off from the other, the above notion should be exactly reversed. One of the greatest errors that continued up to a very recent date, with regard to the researches in Jainism carried on by European scholars, was about the relative antiquity of Jainism and Buddhism. About a quarter of a century ago, European students in their first studies of Jainism were struck by the abundant similarity of doctrine and dogma in the Jaina and Buddhist literatures. As a provisional theory based on insufficient data, the opinion was advanced that Jainism was an offshoot of Buddhism. Popular historians and other writers promulgated the opinion, till by sheer force of repetition it began to be looked upon by many men as being an accurate statement of fact. But it was nothing such. Further researches in the same field led Dr. H. Jacobi to doubt the theory in the early eighties. In 1884 and 1894 he published his translations of four Jaina books in the XXII and XLV Vols. of the Sacred Books of the East and historically demonstrated that if one of the two sects of the Jainas and Buddhists must be held to be a borrower from the other, the latter and not the former must be this borrower.

A brief summary of the evidence collected by Prof. Jacobi for his views is given below. For a more detailed study of it the reader is referred to the introductions of the two volumes of the S. B. E. mentioned above. Four distinct lines of evidence to prove the antiquity of Jainism are laid down as follows.

1. References in old Buddhist books to well-known and acknowledged doctrines of Jaina theology, metaphysics and ethics. As examples of these the following may be given.

(i) A reference to cold water possessing a soul, *i.e.*, to jivas of *Jalkaya* in Brahmajala sutta of the *DighaNikaya.*

(ii) A reference in the same to the Jaina rejection of the Ajivaka doctrine that the soul has color.

(iii) A reference to the four vows of Lord Parsvanath in the Sammanaphala sutta of the same *Nikaya.* This passage is especially important, as it shows that the Buddhists were also aware of the older tradition of the Jainas with regard to the times and teachings of Lord Parsvanath.

(iv) A reference in the Majjhimma Nikaya to the conversion of Upali, a lay disciple of Lord Mahavira, after a dispute with the Buddha as to the comparative iniquitousness of the sins of the body and the mind.

(v) A reference by the same to the three sorts of *dandas* namely, of body, speech and mind, in which the Jainas believed.

(vi) Abhay, a prince of the Lichchhavis of Vesali refers to the Jaina claims of being able to attain full knowledge and to annihilate karmas, old and new, by means of austerity. (*Anguttara Nikaya*).

(vii) A reference to the Digvirati vow and the Upostha day in the same Nikaya. Digvirati vow, i.e., "I shall go in only certain fixed directions this day." Upostha, keeping of fast in which the laymen are supposed to be like ascetics in their thoughts and deeds.

(viii) In the *Mahavagga*, Siha, the general of the Lichchhavis, and a lay-disciple of Lord Mahavira, goes against his prohibition to see the Buddha, and is converted by him, on being taught the Akriyavada doctrine of Buddhism, which made him secede from the Jain doctrine of Kriyavada, which inculcates a belief in soul, in the world, and in action (believed to be our own doing in such judgments as these: "I did it; I shall cause another to do it; I shall allow another to do it.")

2. The Buddhist records evidence the importance and probable high antiquity of Jainism indirectly also. (i) They mention the Jainas (the Nirgranthas) as the opponents and converts of Buddha and never imply, much less assert, that they are a newly founded sect. (ii) Makkhali Gosala divides mankind into 6 classes. The third class is the Nirgrantha sect. A new sect could not have held such an important place in a division of mankind (iii) The Buddha had a dispute with Sachchaka, who was a non-Nirgrantha son of a Nirgrantha father. This also proves decisively that the Jainas were not an offshoot of Buddhism.

3. The third line is the evidence of the Jaina books themselves. There are no reasonable grounds to reject the recorded tradition of a numerous class of men, as being a tissue of meaningless lies. All the events and incidents that relate to their antiquity are recorded so frequently and in such a matter-of-fact way that they cannot be properly rejected, unless under force of much stronger evidence than the one adduced by the scholars who are sceptic about the antiquity of Jainism. In the *Uttaradhyayana Sutra*, an interview between Gautama and Kesi, the followers of Lords Mahavira and Parsva respectively is held in a garden and after a good conversation carried on more or less in occult terms, the two leaders recognise the fundamental unity of the doctrines of their respective teachers and leave the garden fully convinced that they are workers in the same field. This again points out to an older Jaina faith which prevailed before the advent of Mahavira and which was so vigorously reformed by him.

4. The last line of evidenee is the ancient character of Jaina philosophy. Professor Jacobi refers to three things in this connection. (i) The animistic beliefs of Jainas and (ii) the absence of the category of quality in their enumeration of the principal constituent elements of the Universe. (iii) The inclusion of Dharma and Adharma in the class of substances in Jainism. Dharma, according to the Jainas is that which helps the motion of things, in the same way as water helps the motion of fish. Adharma, is that which becomes the means and perhaps the motive also of stopping motion; as the shade of a tree which tempts the weary traveller to rest in his journey. Dharma and Adharma, along with Jiva (soul), Pudgala (matter), Kal (Time) and Akasha (space) are considered to be the six eternal Padarthas or Elements of the Universe. From a consideration of these facts

in Jaina philosophy, Professor Jacobi concludes that it was evolved in a very early period of the Aryan settlement in India; which, of course, means that the Jaina creed has got, if not more than, at least as many eenturies as Buddhism between its present state and the time of its origination. And this explodes once and for ever the error that Jainism is an offshoot of Buddhism.

The Story of Sridhatta.

THE following episode is taken from *Gandhervatataiyarilambakam*, the third chapter in the famous Tamil Jaina Epic "Jivaka Chintamani."

There lived in Rajamapuram a merchant-prince Sridhatta by name, whose vast heritage was gradually lost till only a ship and some merchandise remained. One day he pondered over the down fallen status of his noble family. "They that are poor grow rich and ride on elephants. The grindstone floats and the gourd sinks down. Therefore it is not wise for one to say, 'Effort is no good; one is happier because of his past merits' and to rue over his low condition as due to his past ill-fated life. Moreover wealth will multiply for one who has a will and takes effort. By that wealth all sorts of happiness can be obtained. But ignorant people, without making any effort, if they sit chanting, 'What should come will not stay away on the way' will add strength to their energetic foes who go about mocking at their laziness. Let all earn that wealth which will make them worthy in the eyes of their foes. Further it will be a good weapon to vanquish their enemies; and with it happiness will also come. Therefore that wealth which will make one happy and enable him to promote righteousness is worthy of seeking. It is the duty of those who earn wealth to support their relations and dependents, in the same manner as the rooting branches of a banyan tree support each other and the main tree. They are mean who are selfish. So I will try and make efforts to win wealth wherewith I may support my people and reinstate my ancestral reputation."

So soliloquising the young merchant went to his store-house and in an auspicious hour conveyed his goods to the harbour and loaded his ship. After distributing some things by way of charity he prayed to the deity, "May this ship sail on without the least danger." A flag was flying at the top of the mast to which

three sails were tied up. The mariners looked cheerful; the conches were blown and the drums were beaten; the sails caught good wind and the fortune-bringing ship sailed out of the harbour swiftly like an elephant running. She sailed on and on swiftly and safely passing by many a landscape till she reached a fertile and prosperous island where the merchant and his men landed with the goods. Sridhatta went to see the king of the place and presented him with a pearl necklace and obtained his permission to sell his things in that island. Under the patronage of the king he stayed there for about six months, making fortune and enjoying the various amusements of the people. When he had sold all his cargo he made preparations to return to his own country. He took leave of the king and his new friends and set sail on a day when the Sagittarius was risen under the star *Revati*. The ship moved on fastly and wildly direct into the midst of the sea a long distance. The sailors got confused and they could not control the ship and turn her in the proper direction. Suddenly clouds gathered and hung over them; darkness came on; a storm arose and there was wind blowing from every side; there was lightning and the clouds thundered and rained. The mariners were greatly frightened and Sridhatta said, "It appears the deity is angry with us; for not only the winds from the eight sides are rough beating against one another and make the waters below roar and boisterous the clouds above us are heavy and shaking. Do not fear at this. If any calamity comes one should laugh at it; when so laughed at our indifference will put an end to the calamity. One cannot save oneself by weeping. Therefore do not weep. Good and bad come to us when they should come. If the days of one's life are exhausted he will die even by drinking a cup of pure water: but if they are full he will not die even though he may be thrown into the midst of the sea. These are the results of past Karmas that bind the souls. Therefore do not give up your manliness. We are driven into the sea unto this danger by evil Karmas. Give up fear and let all of you think of the sacred feet of our Lord."

Though speaking words of comfort and encouragement to others, Sridatta himself was full of fear. His heart was heavy with the thought of impending danger and he stood still drooping his head, while the ship turned round, took in water and the wild wind broke the mast and the ship sank down. Sridhatta caught

hold of a broken piece of mast and with its aid managed to float. The waves carried him on and threw him ashore. The fortune obtained through sinless ways and his sincere men being gone, the merchant thought to himself, "What sort of Karma is this that having created in me a desire to accumulate riches, it has driven me into this dreadful sea, ruined my all and made me helpless and solitary. Which other danger it will not lead me into." So grieving at his own unexpected misfortune, he lay on the sandy beach.

C. S. Mallinâth.

(*To be continued.*)

Notes.

JAINA LAW AND DR. GOUR'S HINDU CODE.

This question is rightly in the forefront of the topics which are agitating the Jaina Community to-day.

European and Indian researches and writings during the last 40 years have proved the priority of Jainism over Buddhism, and the entirely independent origin of Jainism as compared with Brahmanism or Hinduism. Still some hasty and ignorant writers repeat the wrong and exploded views of the last century. This pains the Jainas. They have suffered a lot and with inexhaustible patience. But even the worm turns. The last straw is the fear in the heart of my brethren that in the remote possibility of Hindu Law being codified, their natural and ancient civic rights will be in jeopardy.

A gentleman, who is a scholar and statesman and thoroughly conversant with Jainas and Jainism (specially of the Svetambara sect) has communicated to us, through the Jain Mitra Mandal, Delhi, a well written, and convincing corrective of the errors of Dr. Gour. We publish it elsewhere. The Mandal wishes us to make it public that they have published two more pamphlets on the same topic by C. R. Jain Esq., Bar-at-Law, Hardoi, and by J. L. Jaini Esq., M.A., Bar-at-Law, Saharanpur. These can be had

on application to the Secretary, Jain Mitra Mandal, Dareeba Kalan, Delhi.

We may have to advert to this topic again.

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The following resolution was passed in a meeting of the J. B. Association held on the 21st August 1921.

"This meeting of the Jaina Bros' Association Allahabad notes with grave apprehension the gross misrepresentations against Jainism made by Dr. H. S. Gour in his book entitled "Hindu Code." This meeting emphatically denies the allegations made in sections 296, 297 and 331 of the said book, namely that the Jainas are Hindu heretics, that they are a sub-division of the Vaishas, that their religion is the child of Buddhism, that they have no principles and law of their own etc." This meeting authoritatively asserts that Jainism is an absolutely independent religion, that it has existed from time immemorial, that it has its distinctly own principles, customs and law, and that the Jainas are not subject to Hindu Law."

"The Jaina Bros' Association Allahabad understands with grave concern that Dr. H. S. Gour has moved a resolution in the Legislative assembly, which if carried into effect will be highly prejudicial to the rights of the Jainas. This meeting therefore respectfully but strongly urges upon the Government to give due weight to the Jaina public opinion of the country before arriving at any final decision.

This meeting further prays that His Excellency the Viceroy be pleased to intervene in the matter."

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Mr. Diwanchand Jain, General Secretary, Jain Sumati Mitra Mandal of Rawalpindi writes:—We are sorry to learn the untimely and premature death of the wife of L Radu Shah Jain of Rawalpindi. The following is the list of donation given by Mrs. Koku Shah Radhu Shah, when she was sick. We the members of the Mandal offer our heart-felt sympathy to him in his sad bereavement.

				Rs.
Go-shala, Rawalpindi	...	...	...	51
Jain Jiv Daya Fund, Rawalpindi		...	...	51
Jain Sumati Mitra Mandal ,,		...	...	51
Jain Sumati Girl School ,,		...	...	21
Jain Sumati Night School ,,		...	...	21
Jain Dharm Prakash Sabha ,,		...	...	11
Jain Sthanak ...	...	...	...	15
"Jain Jagat"—Delhi	...	...	...	5
Jain Pardeep—Deoband	...	...	...	5
Jain Gazette—Madras	...	...	...	5
Ahimsa —Benarse	...	...	...	5
Jain Path Pardarshad—Agra		...	...	5
for release of innocent birds		...	...	18

Ourselves.

We very much regret for the unforeseen circumstances that had again caused the delay in the publication of the Gazette. Owing to the Labourer's disturbances and troubles still continuing in Madras tke workmen in the Press where our Gazette is printed absented themselves every now and then. We are trying our best to be regular at any cost. To come up to date we are issuing two Double Numbers of 48 pp. each, and we hope to be in time in future. We wish to inform our Readers that we spare no pains to make the Journal more attractive, substantial, useful and interesting. Arrangements are being made to publish original and authoritative essays on Jaina history, philosophy, and metaphysics. Historical notes on ancient places of Jaina worship and learning are also collected for publication. We take all efforts to satisfy our Readers in every way and we hope that our Jaina brethren and the non-Jaina sympathisers of our Gazette will kindly continue to help us in every possible way as they have been hitherto doing to promote the interests of our Journal. In the end we offer our sincere thanks to all our well-wishers and sympathisers.